Eisenhower Read online

  In July 1932, MacArthur personally led a military force sent by President Hoover to help the local police preserve order in the capital. MacArthur, thirsting for a fight, decided to expand his mission and push the Bonus Army off the mudflats and out of Washington. Accompanied by Major Eisenhower, who hated what was happening, MacArthur escalated a conflict that caused several deaths and in which the veterans’ shanties were burned down. MacArthur had convinced himself that communists were somehow controlling the Bonus Army. If they were not subdued and driven out of the nation’s capital, he thought, they would bring down the American government.13 MacArthur clearly delighted in this embarrassing exercise of power against the bedraggled remnants of the Allied Expeditionary Force.14

  The affair of the Bonus Army gave Ike some things to worry about as he settled into his new position. No longer could he look to his mentor Fox Conner for support if he got into trouble with the mercurial MacArthur. Conner had been ill and his influence in the army was gradually dwindling. Pershing had retired in 1924, and the clique of officers who had served together in the AEF was no longer a dominant force in the service. In 1930, when Conner was a contender to be appointed Chief of Staff, the Grey Eminence lost out to MacArthur. The implications for Ike’s career were clear: he was now flying solo, and he might well be flying straight into a hurricane. In dealing with the Bonus Army, MacArthur had ignored Eisenhower’s advice to stay in his office and let others handle the problem. Instead, MacArthur reveled in the assault and was surprisingly comfortable with his warped view that he was saving the country from a radical revolution. What would it be like to work closely every day with an officer whose powerhouse ego enabled him to see the world in such a distorted fashion?

  One of Ike’s painful jobs was to draft the Chief of Staff’s report on the “Bonus Incident of July 28.” Eisenhower said his paper was “as accurate as I could make it.”15 The report to the secretary of war was, in fact, a standard white paper that served a short-term purpose. The veterans had “defied police authority and were then engaged in riotous activity.” Without loss of life or serious casualties, the army had quickly restored order. After stopping the rioting near Pennsylvania Avenue and 4½ Street, MacArthur turned “then to the encampment, alleged to be occupied by Communists, at 13th and C Streets.” This was followed by the move against the shantytown at Anacostia Flats. As the report concluded: “Thus a most disagreeable task was performed in such a way as to leave behind it a minimum of unpleasant aftermath and legitimate resentment.”16 The press, of course, disagreed with this rosy conclusion. The “Incident of July 28” left a deep, public scar on MacArthur’s reputation—a scar that would cause the Chief of Staff some concern after the Roosevelt administration took office in 1933.17

  Swallowing any nervous reservations he had about his new boss, Major Eisenhower went back to work in a tiny cubbyhole (he called it a closet) adjacent to MacArthur’s office.18 The general’s senior aide was on a short leash and was kept very busy.19 A depressed economy was crimping every government and private institution in the United States, and the army was taking its share of hits. MacArthur mounted a rearguard political campaign in an effort to minimize the budget cuts, and Ike provided backup for the general.

  Following Roosevelt’s election in November 1932, Ike was pleased to see Congress and the White House controlled by one party. His perspective on the nation’s leadership was broadening and becoming somewhat deeper. In the worst years of the economic collapse, he remained hopeful. Power, he thought, had to be centralized if the nation was going to get out of the depression. “Only in that way,” he wrote, “will confidence be inspired; will it be possible to do some of the obvious things for speeding recovery, and will we be freed from the pernicious influence of noisy and selfish minorities.”20 From Ike’s perspective, the army was not one of those “selfish minorities.” He was concerned when it suffered painful budget cuts despite his and MacArthur’s efforts.

  Other than commenting on the need for centralization during the Great Depression, Eisenhower had little to say about the details of reform politics. He was not inclined to muse on the changing nature of the administrative state or on the surges of liberal reform that predated and had considerable influence on the New Deal. Neither nineteenth-century Populism nor twentieth-century Progressivism popped into mind when he was surrounded and practically suffocated by the nation’s most formidable reform movement since the abolition of slavery. His brother Milton, who was now an important executive in the Department of Agriculture, had a much better knowledge of the political transformation taking place in Washington during the New Deal.21

  Ike’s interest in politics was instrumental and relatively narrow. He and his boss were focused on the fact that the army was shrinking while its responsibilities were increasing. In the summer of 1933, the army became responsible for transporting and housing the millions of young men who were being taken into the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). As Ike noted in his diary, the New Deal first tried to launch the program entirely under the CCC, but the new organization was slow to get under way. To make a dent in the high unemployment rate, the administration needed quick action using existing organizations. The army was called in, and it rapidly got the program moving. This success probably helped the Chief of Staff fend off more drastic budget cuts, but the CCC program strained the resources of a slimmed-down military.22 Pay cuts followed, and Eisenhower found himself playing a growing role in a shrinking, dispirited army that was under attack from Congress and the press.23 Overworked, underpaid, and suffering renewed bouts of ill health, Eisenhower came to resent “the years spent as a slave in the War Department.”24

  Despite this “slave’s” resentment, his master found little to criticize in Eisenhower’s performance. Ike had learned how to function within the parameters set by his boss and the US Army, and he produced in clear, forceful English the orders, reports, and plans that General MacArthur needed on a daily basis. Fox Conner had been a great teacher, and his student was now able to pound out, on schedule, day after day, exactly what the army’s top officer demanded.

  By this time, Ike had become a more polished, urbane person. He had lived in France, in Panama, and now in Washington, DC, and those experiences were smoothing out some of the burrs and sharp corners of his small-town personality. He had not sacrificed to the city culture his basic optimism, his small-town friendliness, or his tendency to trust those with whom he worked. But he had changed as he became accustomed to dealing on a daily basis with experienced, powerful leaders. No longer in serious doubt about his professional career, he had reason to be optimistic about his future role in the army. As staff to MacArthur, he had compiled a record that any officer in the US Army would have been pleased to have.

  Dangerous Duty on the Philippine Frontier

  Eisenhower was so successful in this role that MacArthur decided to keep him on his team when the general left the Office of the Chief of Staff for his next tour of duty. That would be in the Philippines, where MacArthur had served before. Now he would be the military advisor to the newly created commonwealth government of the Philippines.25 MacArthur would need an effective team if he was going to succeed in organizing a new fighting force capable of defending the commonwealth. In 1935, he built his team around Eisenhower, who was offered an appointment as assistant military advisor. MacArthur cleverly sweetened the offer by allowing Ike to choose a regular army officer to assist him.

  This was a hard decision for Ike. He wanted to command troops instead of serving another tour as a staff officer. He was also nervous about spending more time under MacArthur’s thumb. For the previous two years he had not disappointed his boss or challenged MacArthur’s authority. When there were differences, Ike bit his tongue, suppressed his anger, and did everything he could to advance the work of the Chief of Staff and the US Army. That was a hard life for Major Eisenhower even though he had made considerable progress in developing a conciliatory, compromising approach to military authority and his c
areer.26 Convinced that he could always master his anger, he was tempted and ultimately persuaded by the honor of being chosen by the top officer in the US Army.27 Even though he knew that duty in the Philippines would mean more years of living on the edge of professional disaster, he accepted MacArthur’s offer and selected his friend Major James B. Ord to accompany them. He and Ord shortly got a memorable display of the general’s capacity for anger.

  Leaving Mamie and his young son John in the United States, Eisenhower and Major Ord accompanied MacArthur and his entourage on the long, slow journey to the Philippines. The trip started on a low point. The general erupted in rage when he learned that he had immediately been demoted to his permanent rank as a two-star general. He had hoped to arrive in his new post as the army’s only four-star. But President Franklin D. Roosevelt either forgot his agreement with the general or, more likely, embraced an opportunity to cut into the prestige of the former Chief of Staff.28 Fortunately for Ike, he had done nothing to inspire the outburst. All he had to do was listen and nod. He was already good at that and was going to get even better. But the episode stuck in his mind and gave him an unforgettable sense of MacArthur’s potential for explosive anger when he was thwarted.29

  Living on the Edge

  After a comfortable sea voyage, General MacArthur and his military mission landed in the Philippines in October 1935. Ike started his diary record of the mission in December. “The group,” he wrote, “is so organized that the detailed work connected with the development of the Philippine Defense Plan falls principally upon Major James B. Ord (in this narrative referred to as ‘Jimmie’) and myself. Captain T. J. Davis serves as General MacArthur’s aide, is the administrative officer for the whole group and is in charge of such matters as motor transportation, clerical assistance, normal administrative contacts with the Philippine Department and so on. Major Howard J. Hutter, Medical Corps, is specifically charged with the development of a sanitary plan for the Philippine Army and in addition serves as personal physician for the group. General MacArthur is the head of the Mission and is officially designated as the military advisor to the Philippine government. He directs policy and, except in matters of detail, does all the contact work with the President of the Commonwealth.”30

  While perfectly logical, this plan for the organization of the mission would quickly begin to change as personalities and the daily demands of practice trumped the standard army style of organization. Some of the changes eventually clouded Ike’s relationships with his volatile boss. But initially Eisenhower and MacArthur worked together in an effort to develop a force that could defend the Philippines. Neither man was pleased by the situation they found in their new outpost. Both were severely limited in what they could accomplish in the Philippines, on the far eastern edge of an overextended American empire. Japan’s military and industrial power had been growing for many decades, but neither MacArthur nor Eisenhower—nor, for that matter, the US War Department—seemed fully aware of how serious that threat was to the status quo in the Pacific. A great gulf had opened between American interests and American power.

  When the Roosevelt administration hesitated about shipping some obsolete rifles to the Philippines, Ike got an early warning that the defense of the new commonwealth was not a major priority in Washington. For most Americans the top priority seemed to be staying out of another war. Even those who were charged with charting strategy in the event of war were doubtful that the Philippines could be defended. Eisenhower thought the administration’s policy was “short-sighted,” but all he could do was to keep pushing.31

  That forced MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Ord to turn to the new Philippine government for the resources they needed to conduct their American military mission. But as the first president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Manuel Quezon, repeatedly made clear, his country could not afford a major rearmament with modern weapons. True to their personalities and leadership styles, MacArthur and Eisenhower reacted differently to that constraint. The general chose largely to ignore the lack of Philippine resources. He simply adopted unrealistic plans, exuded optimism, and left Eisenhower and Ord to scrape around the bottom of the barrel for the men, arms, and munitions they needed. This was a second showing for Ike, who during the world war had trained a tank battalion without any tanks. He had organized Camp Colt in the bitter cold without stoves for the tents. So he swallowed his concerns and tried to get as much as he could from the Philippine and American governments.

  Not much was available. The United States—which by Filipino standards was a rich nation even in the depressed 1930s—had begun paying a price for the deep cuts Congress and presidents had made in military budgets since 1920. “Our budget,” Ike noted, “had been based on the assumption that every material assistance in the armament question would be forthcoming from the United States and if this support should be denied, we are going to be very badly handicapped.”32 They were. Neither the Roosevelt administration nor the services could decide whether the Philippines could or should be defended.33 Ord’s trip back to Washington in 1937 to beg for support yielded only some antiquated arms, and too few of them.34 Eisenhower, who had an excellent grasp of the problems of mobilization, did not do much better when he, too, went to Washington the following year seeking support.

  The Team Starts to Fracture

  While straining to get a defense organized, MacArthur’s team started to come apart. The first break came quickly, when the general was appointed a field marshal in a Philippine army that existed only in planning documents. Ike thought it was absurd. He told MacArthur that it was a serious mistake to accept the new commission and to receive the handsome salary he was provided.35 Eisenhower turned down a similar appointment for himself, as did Ord. MacArthur exploded. “The General is,” Ike noted, “more and more indulging in a habit of damning everybody, who disagrees with him over any detail, in extravagant, sometimes almost hysterical fashion. I’ve seen him do this, second hand, in the past, but now he seems to consider that the combined use of his rank, a stream of generalizations that are studded with malapropos, and a refusal to permit the presentation of opposing opinion will, by silencing his subordinates, establish also the validity of his contentions.”36 MacArthur’s outbursts drove Ike, Ord, and T. J. Davis together as increasingly nervous and concerned partners in an enterprise that was stumbling.37

  At times the spats between Ike and his boss had an almost comic aspect, especially when they involved issues that had nothing to do with their mission. The US presidential election in 1936 provoked MacArthur, who remained fiercely bitter about the way FDR had treated him as he left for the Philippines. The bitterness warped his political judgment and left him looking forward with hope to a victory by Alf Landon, the Republican candidate from Kansas. Although deep in his heart Ike was still a Kansan, he had a more realistic view of the election. He and T. J. Davis urged caution, but the general exploded again: “We couldn’t understand the reason for his almost hysterical condemnation of our STUPIDITY until he suddenly let drop that he had gone out and urged Q[uezon] to shape his plans for going to U.S. on the theory that Landon will be elected.… WHY should he get sore just because we say ‘Don’t be so d_____ certain, and go out on a limb unnecessarily’??? Both of us are ‘fearful and small minded people who are afraid to express judgments that are obvious from the evidence at hand.’ Oh hell.”38

  A far more ominous development took place gradually, without any explosions—at first. The initial plan was for the general to handle ongoing relations with President Quezon. They had known each other for years, and MacArthur’s reputation in the islands was strong and positive. Ike encouraged the general to see Quezon once a week, but MacArthur refused. Ord and Eisenhower tried, Ike wrote, “time and again, to get the general to stay in closer contact with Q. Things happen, and we know nothing of them. We’re constantly wondering whether the President will approve or disapprove. We ought to know! We could if the general would take the trouble to see Q weekly—but he apparently th
inks it would not be in keeping with his rank and position for him to do so!!!!!”39

  With no apparent plan in mind, Ike slowly began to fill this vacuum. He had an office in the presidential residence, the Malacañan. He and Quezon began to spend more time together, first discussing the military organization and then eventually covering other political issues and even personal matters. Eisenhower drafted a speech for the president.40 In brief, they became friends and colleagues in a common enterprise.41 Unfortunately, this left the general feeling pushed aside, off the playing field. That was a situation MacArthur would not long abide. The relationships became especially dangerous after Ike had some secret meetings with the president to discuss the military options they were facing.42

  The central issue of most of the discussions and the work that Eisenhower and Ord were doing on a daily basis involved getting a reasonable force organized despite the unreasonable financial restraints that none of them could change. Numbers loomed large. MacArthur started out planning for a thirty-division force. By training 20,000 to 25,000 men a year, MacArthur estimated, they would soon have a strong reserve and the core of the divisions he contemplated. Ike (forcefully) and Ord (more pleasantly) contended these plans were unrealistic. “After days of wrangling and arguing on the subject,” Ike said, “he gave J[immie Ord] and me a ridiculous lecture on ‘sufficiency in strength’ of armies.… He makes nasty cracks about ‘technicians’ and ‘small-minded people’ when we try to show that we are simply arguing from the standpoint of the amount of money available.”43 Eisenhower dutifully wrote a report along lines prescribed by the general. He had learned how to swallow hard and write a white paper on the Bonus Army affair, and he did the same thing in Manila. But as Eisenhower had already concluded, the plan left a deficit of more than 30 million Philippine pesos.44